John Locke and other Enlightenment philosophers often present rationality and autonomy as the basis for human equality. The American Founders used these arguments to justify their revolution. However, American philosopher and law professor Martha Nussbaum argues that this basis is insufficient. Recognizing human dignity as an additional basis for equality would fortify our founding values against tyrannical manipulation.
I read Locke and Nussbaum side by side this month after I attended the American Enterprise Institute Winter Honors Program. The three-day seminar celebrated the 250th anniversary of the American Revolution and recalled the modern influence of the ideas that inspired the Declaration of Independence. The program included a seminar on Locke and his influence, especially that of The Second Treatise of Government.
Locke bases human equality on all being endowed with reason by a Creator. From this premise, he derives natural rights, the consent of the governed, and the social contract. He writes, “Men being…by nature all free, equal, and independent, no one can be put out of this estate, and subjected to the political power of another, without his own consent.” According to Locke, equality and rationality allow people to recognize tyrannical governments with “a long train of abuses” against its people and the justification to rebel when legitimate abuse occurs.
I agree with Locke that the possession of reason is a proof for universal human equality. However, basing human equality on an internal characteristic opens the door to reason being redefined such that not all humans are equal. The philosopher Martha Nussbaum finds, “The classical theorists all assumed that their contracting agents were men who were roughly equal in capacity…They thus omitted from the bargaining situation women…children, and elderly people—although the parties might represent their interests.” Something external to humanity must give a source for its equal political value in terms of the social contract in order to account for all humans who are able to consent. As Locke acknowledges a creator, equality can be found in the conferred value humans have because all are made in the image of God.
Conferred dignity brings additional grounds for political equality in moral equality, an observation shared by Nussbaum. She finds that Locke’s understanding of the social contract is underdeveloped. If Locke had continued in his line of thinking, he would have arrived at a dignity-based entitlement theory for equality and consent. Additionally, Locke equates moral equality and equal political power. Nussbaum writes, “Whether we should grant that equal powers entail moral equality is profoundly unclear. The right way to ground moral equality almost certainly does not involve reliance on a putative power-equality.”
Rather than rights to equal political power being the basis for moral equality, equal dignity forms the basis for moral equality and the right to political equality. Humans are valuable because they are created by God, which means their moral equality comes from an external source. Because all have equal dignity and value, humans have the claim to political equality and can form a social contract in which they can remove their consent if their dignity-based rights are violated. Dignity thus creates a social contract based on the real moral equality of persons and not just manufactured political equality.
Dignity thus creates a social contract based on the real moral equality of persons and not just manufactured political equality.
Nussbaum provides an additional concern about the disabled and political equality based on reason. She writes, “No social contract doctrine, however, includes people with severe and atypical physical and mental impairments… such people were simply not included in society. They were excluded and stigmatized; there was no political movement to include them.” This is notable not only because the disabled have a role in political society because they are citizens of nations, but also because of the potential manipulation of reason being the basis of equality.
If a person is deemed to be without reason, either because of disability or if one’s views are deemed “unreasonable,” their rights can be unjustly violated.
Suppose a tenant of reason was the belief that what is reasonable is fully determined by the government. If one disagreed with the government, such a citizen could be deemed unreasonable, removed from the social contract, imprisoned, or worse. Because this citizen was removed from the social contract, they would have no ability to resist or escape their situation. After all, such an unreasonable person has no ability to consent in the first place. Without reason, one cannot consent to the social contract and cannot receive the benefits of protection of the government. That protection is even more important to the disabled who can easily be and often are marginalized in political society.
When God made humans in His image, he gave them dignity that provided an external basis for their political equality. This external basis creates a clear and stable foundation because it comes from a Creator rather than a human concept which can be manipulated for tyrannical gain.
